

# Ethnic Terrorism as a Political Tactic in Nigeria: Implications for Nigeria's External Relations

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**ABSTRACT**—*In Nigeria, ethnic groups have established “puppet” terrorist organizations, whose purpose is to act on behalf of the sponsoring ethnic group, to further their interests and to represent their positions in national sphere. Ethnic terrorism as a political tactic explains how ethnic groups effectively wage a low level war against national government without the risk of escalation. By this thesis, ethnic terrorism as experienced in Niger Delta (Militants) and Northern Boko Haram are political tactic, which indeed centre on national question, around which a great deal of all our national life revolves, and in the name of which all sort of crimes have been perpetrated against the nation. This paper gives a brief explanation of Niger Delta Militancy and Northern Boko Haram activities and how ethnic agenda or interest (struggle to control the nation's resources) contributed to their formation in Nigeria. It further explores possible implications of ethnic terrorism for the nation's external relations. To address this problem, the paper suggests national dialogue that will encourage national integration and avert ethnic bitterness and violence.*

**Keywords**— Ethnic, Terrorism, Niger-Delta Militancy, Boko Haram, External relations

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The activities of Niger Delta Militants and Northern Boko Haram have come to be acknowledged as a watershed in Nigeria and International concern with the issue of Nigeria's domestic terrorism and the real imagine danger pose to Nigeria's external relations. Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram insurgency in the Northern part of Nigeria did not occur in isolation or their related terrorist event reflect a sudden new threat but the symbolic reaffirmation of a trend (especially ethnic dynamics) that had been evident for several years.

The common perception for much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was that terrorism was a contest between two sides; on the one hand, a shadowy, somewhat connected group of people of an organization, and on the other, a sovereign state with the power of the law and legal if not democratic legitimacy. In this case, the group did not personify any particular tribe or ethnic group. However, in contemporary Nigeria, various ethnic groups have used terrorist organization to promote their interests in the domestic domain.

In Nigeria, ethnic groups have established “puppet” terrorist organizations, whose purpose is to act on behalf of the sponsoring ethnic group, to further their interest and to represent their positions in domestic (National) sphere. This allowed ethnic groups to effectively wage a low level war against rival power (National government) without the risk of escalation (KIA, 2013). Ethnic groups sponsoring domestic terrorism deny involvement, but hide behind the scene to encourage and support ethnic terrorism.

In this case, ethnics sponsor terrorist organization on the basis of mutual interests. The patron ethnic group provides its beneficiary terrorist organization with political support, financial assistance, and the sponsorship necessary to maintain and expand its struggle. Depending on proximity and borders some ethnic groups also provide a safe haven for terrorist who carry out raids across the country. The patron ethnic groups in Nigeria uses the terrorist groups to perpetrate acts of terrorism as a means of spreading either their ideology or to gain control of the state power. Ethnic terrorism seems to be more prevalent especially, during the democratic dispensation. (1999 – to date).

## 2. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that conveys many meanings and carries different connotations. In line with this thought, scholars have noted that there is no single universally acceptable explanation of terrorism. One of the apostles of this thought **Sabir (2007)** stated that “the duplicity and the trend slogan of one man's terrorism is another person's freedom fighter”. This poses definitional problem. Sociologists, criminologist and political scientists in their search for universally acceptable definition have ended with polarized views based on their ideological leanings. Rather

than propounding any specific definition which may limit any enduring conceptualization, this work will look at the various viewpoints on the subject matter.

The term terrorism is commonly referred to as;

**“The use of violence such as bombing, shooting, or kidnapping to obtain political demands such as making a government to do something.”**

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language went further to conceive terrorism as;

**“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group, against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or government often for ideological or political reasons.”**

Chukwuemeka and Obingene (2001:149) say that:

**“it is gradually unconventional political violence staged with the intent of reaching a wider audience through spectacular acts that violate accepted social norms.”**

Notwithstanding, the UN proffers a tentative definition that it believes, has clear moral force to guide its actions and deliberations on the issue. In its words, the UN states that;

**“In addition to actions already prescribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism, if it is intended to cause death or serious body harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act”.** (The Guardian, March 28, 2005:10).

The concept of terrorism becomes more encompassing and relatively precise when taken in the light of the definitions given by **Hardman (1937) and Wilkinson (1993)**. These authorities agree in principle with the notion of terrorism as it relates to the use of violence against targets for some objectives, yet, they stand distinctive by stressing features, which differentiate terrorism from just mere violence. Hardman presents terrorism as **“The method of theory behind the method whereby an organized group of party seeks to achieve its avowed aim chiefly through the systematic use of violence.**

In the same vein, Wilkinson conceives terrorism as: **The coercive intimidation, premeditated acts or threats of violence, systematically aimed at instilling such fear in the target to alter its behavior in the way desired by the terrorist”.**

The salient points inherent in Hardman and Wilkinson’s conception of terrorism are succinctly captured in the fact that terrorism must be systematic, premeditated, and calculate. It has to be dutifully planned, organized and managed to the point of execution such that even after an attack; a great deal of management still goes on. This concerns managing reactions from both public and private quarters as well as information concerning the perpetrators.

**Charles (2002:41) in Sabir (2007:36)** describes the US British version of terrorism:

**“Terrorism is the calculated use or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies”.**

Similarly, the United State Department of Defense defines terrorism as:

**“The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological”** (Shola 2003:16).

From the conceptualization above, it would be clearer to describe militancy from the context of its activities in the Niger Delta, as the use of force conception of militancy corroborates the Machiavellians politics of the ends justifying the means. And it owes much to the activities of the dissatisfied people mostly youth of the Niger Delta who employ arms and ammunitions to bring to attention the plight of their people. The militant strategies include kidnapping of expatriate workers, hostage and ransom taking, oil pipelines vandalization and attack on oil installations and forced closure of oil flow stations, and more recently kidnapping of relations of those who are perceived to be in authority and controlling the instrument of power that offers protection to multinational oil companies.

It would be proper to suggest that the use of force in the Niger Delta became apparent viewing from the theoretical standpoint of conflict and social change, and paradoxical realities in the region. Approaching from the theoretical view point, it is argued that social change is ubiquitous, and instability or conflict is evidence in society. For social change to occur, conflict in what ever form is expected. It is therefore altruism that conflict no doubt is an inherent attitude of

society (Barikor, 2001). Corroborating this assertion, Douglas *et al*, (2004) established linkages between oil and violent. According to them, the annals of oil are uninterrupted chronicle of naked aggression, exploitation, and the violent laws of the corporate frontier. Iraq was born from this, the use of militant Islamism across the Q'ran belt and the carriage on the road to Baghdad, all bear out the continuing dreadful dialectics of blood and oil. Nigeria bears all the hallmarks of such petrolic violence.

Scholars such as Douglas *et al* who hold this view believe that conflict or violence is not necessary bad as it serves as vehicles for addressing contentious issues such as the Niger Delta problems. This line of thought argued that one cannot have changes within a system according to prescribed rules. Dudley also asserted that for practical equilibrium in the system, the constitutive rules must be in congruence with the regulative rules. And when there are in congruities, there is bound to be instability in a bid to remove in congruities often through civil violence or social revolution.

On the other hand, other scholars posit that the using non-prescriptive rule in bring about change is bad and undesirable as it forms the basis for sharp contract which often are dysfunctional in nature. It is in the light of this view that the Nigerian state apparatus and agents have continually attacked militancy from the negative perspective and only from the view point of "security risk" and criminality". From whatever perspective it is conceived, it is a common phenomenon that militancy is a result of dissatisfaction that are associated with allocation and relocation of value and resources. Following from this stand point, ethnic terrorist is the conscious and persistent disagreement between Nigerian State and Ethnic groups for perceived injustice.

A look at the various definitions above shows that there are three perspectives of terrorism, the terrorists, the victims, and the general public. The phrase "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" is a view terrorists themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for what they believe in, by whatever means possible. Terrorist are persons who take part in terrorism and use threat to cause collateral damage. They terrorize people and cause great fear by being aggressive or violent so that other would be afraid and defend themselves or to oppose them. A terrorist is a criminal with no regard for human life.

For the purpose of this work, and using our theoretical framework of analysis, terrorism would be conceived to connote the use or threat of violence for political aims or to force a government to act because of fear it causes among the people. It is an act of violence carried out by a rebellious group or individuals to get certain viewpoints acknowledge or recognized by the society and/or government. It is a use of force to impose the vested interest of the violent groups. Terrorism can therefore, be conceived as a strategy of violence designed to inspire terror within a particular segment of a given society. Terrorists do not discriminate between combatants and non combatants, or if they do, they broaden the category of "combatants" so much as to render it meaningless. Ultimately, the difference between insurgency and terrorism comes down to the intent of the actor. Insurgency movements and guerilla forces can adhere to international norms regarding the law of war in achieving their goals, but terrorists are by definition committing crimes both civil and military legal codes.

One point is less debatable: terrorism is not new. Indeed, in some respects, terrorism predates the modern term used to describe it. This is not to say that the act of terrorism has remained static rather, as the difficulties involved in defining it reflects, terrorism has evolved considerably over the years, however, retaining some of the characteristics that historically typified it. Thus, violence terror is experienced today does not occur in isolation, nor do terrorist attacks reflect a sudden new trend.

It is however, the symbolic reaffirmation of trends that had been evidenced in human society for several years (Stefan, 2003). From the reviewed literature above, it would be proper to suggest that terrorism in Nigeria dates back to Maitatasine in Yan Qwaki quarters in Kano, Mekanikim of Zaria, to the militants in the Niger Delta, and MASSOB in the South East among others. It, however, gained ascendancy with the advent of the Boko Haram group in 2006 and climbed to its apex from 2011 till now due to its renewed dimension and degree of operations.

Terrorism in Nigeria from whatever perspective it is conceived, is attributed to the nation's domestic policies, unresolved contradictions inherent in the imported western socio economic and political ideas, class configuration, and our inability to define what Nigeria is. This has often times resulted to insurgency that cannot be divorced from the beliefs and shared ideas of the people especially, as evidenced in the current Boko Haram terrorism in the Northern part of the country.

This ethnic regional dynamism is reinforced by the relative economic prosperity associated with real/image favor derived from political advantage that accrues to group or region in control public affairs in Nigeria. Therefore, what follows the ethnicizing or regionalizing politics is that violence or terror becomes the tool of securing economic consumption best guaranteed by state power. Ethnic groups that lost in the contest for power resort to violence and since ethnicity is close to core of individual identify, perceived injustice generate powerful collective reaction. From the above

discourse, it can be inferred that there is a significant relationship between violence or terror in Nigeria and, ethnicity rooted in the national question. This is evidenced in the work carried out on the Niger Delta Crisis by **Nnaa, (2010)** that militancy is driven by oil politics and unhealthy struggle for control of political power and economic resources among the three major ethnic groups of Hausa Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. In 1967, Late Ojukwu Odumegwu, of the Igbo extraction felt the right of his people to the nation's resources was circumscribed by the Hausa/Fulani control of the state wealth. It was then, his calculation that Biafra should control of the huge oil resources would be guaranteed by independence Igbo Biafra country. He, thus, declared a Biafran state, a declaration that three the nation into a civil war for a period of thirty months (1968-1970).

On the other hand, the factor that gave Ojukwu the confidence for the sustainability of his renegade republic also spurred the Mafia mostly of Northern ruling class that held sways in the military into not allowing the Igbo ethnic group to break away.

In the same vein, the perceived alienation of his people (Niger Delta) from the Nation's wealth, despite the fact that the region contributed immensely to the nation's wealth, spurred Jasper Isaac Adaka Boro to declare the Niger Delta people's Republic, a revolution code-named operation zero that lasted for 12 days. The Boko Haram bombing in the Northern part of Nigeria is also not an exception to this rule. According to **Tell, March (2011)**, the Muslim ruling class from the Northern Nigeria felt they have been sidelined, as they are no longer accorded the automatic dominance they enjoyed under post independence military rule, and therefore, made Islamic tendency a political weapon to unleash violence. This fact is corroborated by a US defense analyst who observed that "in the context of Northern political decline on the National level, they (Northern ruling class) raised quite successfully the banner of Sharia to reinforce their position". (**Tell, May, 2011**). It is the same survival strategy as noted by the study that gave birth to Boko Haram, which today has outgrown its political sponsor and is networking with international terrorist network (**Tell, May, 2011**). The implied situation from the above analysis is that the control of state resources is unquestionably linked to the raison deter for political violence in Nigeria.

However, the cost of ethnic conflict or warfare, and concern about non conventional escalation as well as the danger of defeat and perhaps, the unwillingness to appear as the ethnic aggressor have turned ethnic warfare into terrorism in Nigeria. Accordingly, terrorism becomes an efficient, convenient and generally discrete weapon for ethnic groups seeking to either protect or promote perceived interests or common ideas. This explains why terrorism in Nigeria is linked to groups driven by some few individuals or group of individuals with selfish ideological persuasion.

### **3. MODES OF OPERATION**

All terror groups usually keep their plans secret, operating underground and away from the public and government authorities. Niger Delta militant groups and Boko Haram terrorist group are organized which are part of a larger terrorist network and several of their cells work together to plan a terrorist attack. Members of one cell only know about the adjacent cell, but aren't aware of any other cells. This means that if members of one cell are captured, the entire network will not be discovered. This way, terror groups maintain secrecy and can plan their attacks to make them as surprising as possible amongst other modes of operations in Nigeria include some of the followings;

- **Bombings:** Bombings are the most common modes of operation used by Boko Haram, because of its simplicity and lack of the need of skill to create plant and detonate a crude bomb. Ndor (2012) posits that modern devices are smaller and are harder to detect. They contain very destructive capabilities and can be detonated by time delay detonators, and control detonators which use radio or other electronic signals, command-wire detonators which use a button pressed to triggered the explosion.
- **Hostage Taking:** Involves the seizure of a facility or location and the taking of hostage of potential victims. Hostage taking provokes a confrontation with authorities. It forces authorities to either make dramatic decisions or to comply with the terrorist demands. Both groups adopted in strategy.
- **Kidnapping/Hostage – Taking:** Kidnapping involve unlawful arrest and the taking away of a person or persons by unauthorized person(s) for the purpose of attracting the attention of a person, authority, group(s) or the society in general. It could be for the purpose of assassination or for ransom. This strategy is common to Niger Delta militant groups.
- **Armed Attacks and Assassinations:** Armed attacks include rands and ambushes. Assassinations are the killing of a selected victim usually by bombing or small arms. They use automatic five drums such as assault riffles, pistols, machine guns and submachine guns or riffles with simper sights. Both groups employed this strategy.
- **Oil Pipelines Vandalization and Attack on oil installation and forced closure of oil flow stations** are mostly use by Niger Delta militant groups.

#### 4. RECORDS OF NIGER DELTA TERRORIST RELATED ATTACKS

**January 2006 and July 2007**

DATES	EVENTS
January 10, 2006	Militants kidnapped four foreign oil workers from shells offshore E.A. oil field. Shell was forced to shut 115,000bpd E.A. platform. The Militants also blew up crude oil pipelines, cutting supplies to forcados export terminal by 100,000 bpd.
February 30, 2006	Militants freed all hostages kidnapped by January 19, but threatened a wave of new attacks.
February 18, 2006	Militants attacked a barge operated by US oil Services Company, Willbros in speedboats and abducted nine oil workers. The militant also blew up a shell crude oil pipeline operated by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. (NNPC). They also bombed shell's forcados tanker loading platform, forcing the company to suspend exports from the 38,000bpd facility. The closure of forcados affected other companies, cutting futher 100,000 bpd output. Shell had to shut 115,000 bpd E.A. platform as precaution.
March 1, 2006	Militants released six of the hostages kidnapped February 18: they included one American, two Egyptians, two Thais and one Filipino.
March 18, 2006	Militants blew up oil pipeline operated by Italian oil Company Agip, shutting 75000 bpd.
March 27, 2006	Militants released the remaining three hostages kidnapped at Wilbros on February 18. They were two Americans and on Briton
May 10, 2006	An oil executive working for an American Company named, Baker Hughes was killed by an unidentified gunman in Port Harcourt. The movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta denied responsibility.
May 11, 2006	Eight foreign workers were kidnapped by armed men from an offshore oil rig owned by the Norwegian company Fred Olsen energy, near the town of Warri. Aberdeen based dolphin drilling which operated the rig announced suspension of drilling.
June 7, 2006	Militant attacked shell operated natural gas facility in the Niger Delta, Killing six soldiers and took away five south Korean contractors.
June 20, 2006	Two Filipinos with Beaufort International were kidnapped in Port Harcourt, but were freed five days later.
July 6, 2006	Gunmen kidnapped Michael Los, a Dutch oil worker in Yenegoa, Bayelsa state. Los worked for west minister Dredging, a contractor to Royal Dutch shells PLC; he was released four days later.
July 25, 2005	Militants struck at the Agip Ogbainbiri flow station in one sweep seized 24 workers hostage. Hostages released and flow station abandoned July 31 after been paid off by Nigerian government.
August 3, 2006	German oil worker, Guido Schiffarth, a 62 year old employee of Bilfinger and Berger was snatched from his car in Port Harcourt by armed men dressed.
August 4, 2006	Gunmen abduct three Filipino oil workers from a bus in the coastal town of bonny in Rivers State. They are released ten days later
August 9, 2006	Four expatriates; two Norwegians and two Ukrainian oil workers were kidnapped by militants in the Ekeremore suburb of Bayelsa state.
August 10, 2006	A Belgian and Moroccan contractors kidnapped in Port Harcourt. The two oil industry contractors worked for Dredging international firm in Borokiri area of Port Harcourt.

August 13, 2006	Five foreign oil workers (2 Britons, a German, an Irish and a Pole) were kidnapped from a night club in port Harcourt. An American was kidnapped earlier the same day.
	August 4, 2006: An unidentified Lebanese national was kidnapped earlier the kidnapped in Port Harcourt.
August 24, 2006	An Italian oil worker employed by Sapien was kidnapped by gunmen in Port Harcourt
October 2, 2006	25 Nigerian employees of shell contractor were sized by militants after an ambush of boats carrying supplies to shell facility in Cathorne Channel.
October 3, 2006	Seven foreign oil workers (four Britons, one Indonesian, one Malaysian, and a Romanian) kidnapped in a raid on a compound for expatriate contractors working for Exxon Mobil.
November 2, 2006	A British and an American employee of petroleum Geo-services were kidnapped from a survey ship off the coast of Bayelsa.
November 22, 2006	A British oil worker is killed during an attempt by the Nigerian soldiers to free seven hostages abducted by militants earlier the same day.
December 7, 2006	Gunmen kidnapped three Italians and one Lebanese from a residential facility. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility.
December 14, 2006	Gunmen invaded the Nun River logistics base in Bayelsa state operated Dutch shell and hold five people hostage.
December 18, 2006	Two car bombs exploded in Port Harcourt, one near Agip compound and the other in shell residential compound both in the metropolis. There were no casualties.
December 21, 2006	About a dozen gunmen stormed the Obagi field facility operated by Total SA in Rivers state, killing three people. The facility was immediately shut down.
January 5, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped five Chinese telecom workers. They were working on an electricity project when they were attacked by 5am. The sixth Chinese managed to sneak away to tell the story. On the same a car bombed believed to have been planted by militants was discovered in the shell residential compound in Port Harcourt.
January 10, 2007	Gunmen attacked a base operated by South Korea's Daewoo Engineering and Construction in the Bayelsa state kidnapping nine south Koreans and one Nigerian oil worker. .
January 16, 2007	Three people including a Dutch oil worker were killed when their boat, operated by South Korean firm Hyundai, was attacked by Gunmen on their way to Bonny Island export terminal
January 23, 2007	Militants sized German shipping line Baco-Liner Cargo ship on its way to Warri Port taking all 24 Filipino crew members hostage. It was the largest hostage sweep in the history of the menace in the Niger Delta.
January 23, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped two engineers, an American and a Briton, in Port Harcourt, on their way to work.
January 25, 2007	Nine employees of Chinese national petroleum (CNPC) working in Bayelsa state under contract with shell were kidnapped.
Jan. 27, 2007	A Belgian national working for building materials company dies of wounds after gunmen ambushed him in Warri, Delta state.
February 6, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped a Filipino oil worker in Port Harcourt – Owerri road. The police

	escort attached to him lost his life.
February 7, 2007	A Filipino woman was kidnapped by gunmen in Port Harcourt. This apparently was the first abduction of a woman in Niger delta region.
February 7, 2007	The same day, a French oil worker with total oil company named Gerard Laporal, married to the Nigerian woman was kidnapped by gunmen as he returned home around 9:00pm
February 17, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped two Croatians and one Montenegrin who worked for hydro drive Nigerian, an offshore oil services, company, in the Iwofe suburb of Port Harcourt.
February 17, 2007	Four young Nigerian men serving as missionaries for the church of Jesus Christ of latter day saints were abducted from their apartment in Port Harcourt.
February 23, 2007	Unknown gunmen shot dead a Lebanese construction engineer in Port Harcourt. The gun men shot him on the way to work.
February 28, 2007	Dare-devil gunmen in three speed boats stormed the construction yard of German building contractor Bilfinger Berger Port Harcourt at dawn and abducted the company's Dutch security manager after a three hours gun fight.
March 23, 2007	Hours later in the business capital of delta state, warri and other gunmen took two expert rates a Lebanese and an Indian who worked for the construction firm setraco from their office
April 27, 2007	Gunmen killed two police men in an unsuccessful kidnap attempt in Port Harcourt has the officers were escorting a convoy of vehicles carrying expatriate staff to work.
May 1, 2007	Four Italian, an American and a Croatian were kidnapped from an offshore oil facility operated by U.S based chevron in Bayelsa state.
May 3, 2007	MEND kidnapped 20 foreign works in three attacks in Niger delta but, the militants orders the release of eight of the victims within hours
May 5, 2005	Gunmen abducted a British oil worker from Trident 8 rig operated by US based transoceanic off the coast of bayelsa.
May 5, 2005	Separately, gunmen abducted a Belarussian woman, a manager of British Compass group, from outside her home in Port Harcourt's exclusive GRA district. She was the second woman to be abducted by militants in the region.
May 8, 2007	MEND operates blew up three pipelines in the separate places in the region forcing Italin oil giant Eni to halt production from two oilfields. The rebels said that its an email that they bombed the pipelines to embarrass President Olusegun Obasanjo in his last days in the office, and vowed to carry out more attacks
May 19, 2007	Two Indian staff of Indorama (formally Eleme petro chemical company in Port Harcourt), were kidnapped at gunpoint.
May 22, 2007	Four gunmen kidnapped a Lebanese national who worked as the financial controller of oil service Nigercat located in Warri, delta state.
May 24, 2007	Six gunmen kidnapped a polished engineer in Warri. The victim was chief engineer

	for a dredging company, at Orugbo creek near Warri port
May 25, 2007	Nine workers, three Americans, Four Britons, and a south African were kidnapped from the ship off the coast in Bayelsa. The men were seized at a pipe laying vessel contracted to the Nigerian oil company, Conoil.
June 1, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped about 10 senior managers of Indonesian chemical firm Indorama, including the managing director, from the residential estate in Port Harcourt.
June 3, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped six staff of united company RUSAL, the Russian aluminum giants, in Ikot Abasi in the southeast. The men were working at the Aluminum Smelter Company of Nigeria, controlled by RUSAL.
June 15, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped two Lebanese men, working for the Italian firm Stabilini, near Oghara in Delta state. The two men were snatched and taken away by speed boat.
June 21, 2007	Troops killed 12 militants and freed some of the hostages in dawn raid on an Italian operated Ogbainbiri oil facility
July 4, 2007	Armed men attacked shell facilities at Soku and abducted five expatriates, two from New Zealand, one from Australia, one Venezuelan and one from Lebanon.
June 5, 2007	A three years old British child, Margaret Hill was abducted in Port Harcourt. The militants struck when the toddler was being taken home from school
July 7, 2007	Oil giants, shell said that one of its teams had been attacked in Rivers state and two Nigerians were taken hostage.
July 8, 2007	It was confirmed that a Briton was among the two foreign workers kidnapped from a production barge near Calabar in Cross rivers state.
July 16, 2007	A militant group which claimed to be the “Authentic Emancipation of the movement of peace and development in the Niger Delta” (EMOPEND) kidnapped two expatriate oil worker, Alfred Young (Bulgarian), and Packer Hint (Scot) who worked for peak petroleum ay Alabeni, Ekerremor Local Government area, of Bayelsa state. The armed youths came in four speed boats, shooting sporadically into the air before whisking away the two expatriates away to an unknown destination
July 20, 2007	A Lebanese was shot dead in Ogbunali suburb of Port Harcourt metropolis. It was not clear what the motive of his killers.
June 1, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped about 10 senior managers of Indonesian chemical firm Indorama including the managing director, from their residential estate in Port Harcourt.
June 3, 2007	Gunmen kidnapped six staffs of united company RUSAL, the Russian aluminum giants, in Ikot Abasi in the southeast. The men were working at the Aluminum Smelter Company of Nigeria, controlled by RUSAL.
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July 8, 2007	It was confirmed that a Briton was among the two foreign workers kidnapped from a production barge near Calabar in Cross Rivers State.

### 5. LIST OF EVIL ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF BOKO HARAM

7 September 2010	<a href="#">Bauchi prison break</a>
31 December 2010	<a href="#">December 2010 Abuja attack</a>
22 April 2011	Boko Haram frees 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State
29 May 2011	<a href="#">May 2011 northern Nigeria bombings</a>
16 June 2011	The group claims responsibility for the <a href="#">2011 Abuja police headquarters bombing</a>
26 June 2011	Bombing attack on a beer garden in <a href="#">Maiduguri</a> , leaving 25 dead and 12 injured
10 July 2011	Bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State
11 July 2011	The University of Maiduguri temporarily closes down its campus citing security concerns
12 August 2011	Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bana is shot dead by Boko Haram
26 August 2011	2011 Abuja bombing
4 November 2011	2011 Damaturu attacks
25 December 2011	December 2011 Nigeria bombings
5–6 January 2012	January 2012 Nigeria attacks
20 January 2012	January 2012 Kano bombings
28 January 2012	Nigerian army says it killed 11 Boko Haram insurgents
8 February 2012	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the army headquarters in Kaduna.
16 February 2012	Another prison break staged in central Nigeria; 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed.
8 March 2012	During a British hostage rescue attempt to free Italian engineer Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher McManus, abducted in 2011 by a splinter group Boko Haram, both hostages were killed.
31 May 2012	During a Joint Task Force raid on a Boko Haram den, it was reported that 5 sect members and a German hostage were killed.
3 June 2012	15 church-goers were killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi state. Boko Haram claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa.
17 June 2012	Suicide bombers strike three churches in Kaduna State. At least 50 people were killed.
17 June 2012	130 bodies were found in Plateau State. It is presumed they were killed by Boko Haram members.
3 October 2012	Around 25–46 people were massacred in the town of Mubi in Nigeria during a night-time raid.
18 March 2013	2013 Kano Bus bombing: At least 22 killed and 65 injured, when a suicide car bomb exploded in Kano bus station.

7 May 2013	At least 55 killed and 105 inmates freed in coordinated attacks on army barracks, a prison and police post in Bama town.
6 July 2013	Yobe State school shooting: 42 people, mostly students, were killed in a school attack in northeast Nigeria.

## 6. IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC TERRORISM ON NIGERIA’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS

### **Boko Haram and Niger Delta Militancy have possible implications for Nigeria’s External Relations.**

The unfolding crises of security occasioned by Niger Delta Militancy, and Northern Boko Haram have far-reaching implications for the country’s international politics, diplomacy and economic development. The spates of hostilities particularly hostage taking of oil expatriate workers in the Niger delta and bombing of houses, schools, government agencies in the Northern Nigeria are on the extreme. This situation demonstrates largely, the collapse of security in Nigeria. Nearly all countries that partner with Nigeria, in the oil and gas, and other related sectors of the Nation’s economy have had bitter taste of ethnic terrorism in Nigeria. In this circumstance, most countries, especially America and Britain that are critical to the realization of Nigeria’s quest in the global politics are affected and they had warned her citizens to jettison any intention of working in certain states, while those working in the affected areas are advised to leave immediately.

With continuous threat to the lives of foreigners in the country, the image of Nigerian government is being daunted between the international community who began a campaign of calumny, branding Nigeria as a “terrorist state” (Niger Delta Standard Newspaper, March 11, 2007). The US department of states in its annual encyclopedia of global terrorism identified Nigeria as a breeding ground of terrorism and impoverishment. The implications remain that, the collective will and support needed by Nigeria in her quest of becoming a permanent member of the proposed expanded UN Security Council is being undermined by the bad image of terrorist state.

Nation’s image is important to her development quest. The image posture determines the quality of respect that a state earns from other states and other shareholders in the global system. The respect and acceptance that a nation gets is dependent on the core value that it upholds, the effective management of her domestic affairs and the promotion of her people’s interests as well as the conduct of her external relations (Kehinde, 2008) among others. It goes without saying that image issue is comprehensive and holistic, and it goes beyond propaganda and living public relations companies to launder the image of a regime in power.

Kehinde (2008) made it clear that successive governments have been counted to the idea of paying huge amounts of money to foreign agencies to launder their image. He described the situation as “booth and bust image” dynamics characterized by rapid fluctuation between international goodwill and respect, opprobrium and disdain.

Secondly, the terrorist-related activities of Boko Haram and Niger Delta militancy have adversely affected the inflow of foreign investment into Nigeria’s solid mineral sector in the northern part, and oil and gas in the Niger delta.

Thirdly, for Nigeria that has in the last decade played the Big Brother’s role to other African nations, preaching and promoting peace, equity and justice, ethnic terrorism has sent a wrong signal. Her regional status of being the “giant of Africa” is at stake. This situation, Kehinde (2008) observed made some countries in Africa to contest the leadership position with the country. For every available position in which Nigeria has an interest, there are usually some other countries which compete with her and, in some instances, defeating the nation due to the image problem ( ). Nigeria has lost important positions at the level of the AU, and the ADB. For the latter, on two occasions (1995 & 2006) Morocco and Rwanda had respectively defeated Nigeria for the ADB’s presidency.

Terrorists’ tendency of Boko Haram and Niger Delta Militancy may cause a break down of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and the rest of the world. The Philippines threatened to break her relations with Nigeria following the events that led to the kidnapping and killing of one of her citizens (The Punch Newspaper March, 2007). In November, 2007, at least 20 Cameroonian soldiers were killed but were blamed. This situation which could have degenerated into diplomatic row, was saved due to Nigeria’s dexterity response, absolving its troops of any wrongdoing.

The collapse of security in the country due to ethnic terrorism, undermines the nation’s security and her Armed Forces being portrayed as incompetent by the terrorist group. The terrorist activities have the capacity of destabilizing the West Africa sub-region and undermining the efforts of Nigeria to play her desired role in the global politics. Already Princeton, a respected analyst in the west has predicted that Nigeria might be the next Afghanistan ([www.africamasterweb.com](http://www.africamasterweb.com)).

Lastly, ethnic terrorism in Nigeria is a signal to the international community that democracy in the country has not actually corrected the impression about Nigeria, a country with several image problems, lack of transparency, corruption, religious fundamentals etc. International moral and economic support, and foreign aids could be reduced or withheld by donor agencies, international organization due to bad governance and other vices associated with the causes of terrorism in Nigeria. This is because donor countries only assist nations with internationally accepted standards like best practices in public governance.

As part of Nigeria's efforts to fight ethnic terrorism, Nigerian Government signed into law the terrorism (Prevention) Bill 2011 and the Anti-money Laundering (Prohibiting) Amendment Act on the third of June, 2013. The new laws not only outlined measures for the prevention and combating of acts of terrorism, but also prohibit the financing of terrorism and laundering of the proceeds of crime. Nigeria is also working closely with the international community in the fight against this menace. To this end, Nigeria is working closely with the United Nations Counter terrorism implementation task force (CTITF), the counter terrorism executive directorate (CTED), as well as relevant international bodies and friendly countries to sharpen the nation's response mechanisms. In this connection, the United Nations counter terrorism implementation task force launched its first project in Abuja in November, 2011. This aimed at conflict prevention and countering the appeal of terrorism to youth through education and dialogue. In addition, Nigeria is a member of the new global body, the Global Counter – Terrorism Forum (GCTF), initiated to galvanize and pull efforts together to fight the scourge in all its ramifications.

## **7. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

From the foregoing discussion, and using the political economy framework as our unit of analysis, it is evident that the struggle to control national resources among the various ethnic groups continues to foster disaffection and increasingly create violence in Nigeria.

In addition, the dismal level of poverty which is one of the attendant consequences of rugged individualism and excessive quest for materialism made domestic terrorism a recurring feature in Nigeria state with prevailing lack of unity among the ruling class provides or creates enabling and facilitating environment for terrorism in Nigeria. This paper opines that until Nigeria redefines our system, reorder our priorities, pursue an African development model based on our culture, as well as do away with plastic policy options and cosmetic implementation, and face the reality of domestic terrorism, any policy billed to address the issue, will remain a myth or utopian strategy, and this will consequently, affect adversely the degree of peace and development in Nigeria.

## **8. RECOMMENDATIONS**

Weighing the socio-economic, political and psychological effects of terrorism with the Nigerian experience of Boko Haram, this study suggests amongst others, the following recommendations:

- i. There should be a fundamental restructuring of the Nigerian state through the “recurring decimal” of national conference.
- ii. There should be devolution of powers to the component groups on the basis of ethnic nationalities in the true spirit of federalism. This will help to reduce the source of tension and terrorism, and also, the struggle for state power among the various ethnic groups.
- iii. The monopoly of power by the few in ruling class should be broken. Political power holding should not be vested in just a few ruling elites; constitutes of the Nigerian state.
- iv. Government should embark on development projects and programs that are of priority to the people in the Muslim dominated region of the north as well as other parts of the country with the aim of winning over the youths who are easily recruited into terrorist (vanguard) groups. And the project should be such that would generate meaningful employment for the vulnerable youths.
- v. The monstrous evil of the corruption by political office holders should be viewed as a crime that attracts stiffer punishments.
- vi. Nigeria should re-visit its education curricula to include value re-armament based on our traditional heritage, and limits the unwholesome importation of western economic ideas that have the tendencies to destabilize our society and social ties.

- vii. There should be holistic overhauling of the entire national security apparatus in order to have a Nigerian security system that will be accountable only to the people.

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